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Abstract
In this paper we present a macroeconomic model in which changes in
the variance (and higher moments of the distribution) of ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial
conditions ￿ i.e. ￿distributive shocks￿ ￿ are bound to play a crucial role
in the determination of output ￿ uctuations. Firms di⁄er by degree of
￿nancial robustness, which a⁄ect (optimal) investment in a bankruptcy
risk context (￿ la Greenwald-Stiglitz). As to households, for the sake of
simplicity, we assume that they are homogeneous in every respect so that
we can adopt the representative agent hypothesis. We can explore the
properties of the macro-dynamic model either via the study of the two-
dimensional map de￿ning the laws of motion of the average equity ratio
and of the variance of the distribution or via simulations in a multiagent
framework.
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11 Introduction
The representative agent assumption is still the cornerstone of most of contem-
porary macroeconomics but the awareness of its limitations1 is spreading well
beyond the circle of more or less dissenting economists. Also in mainstream
macroeconomics, in fact, the representative agent is not as eagerly embraced as
in the early years of the debate on microfoundations in the remote ￿ 70s and is
still adopted mainly for lack of a workable alternative. In this paper we try to
cast the Financial Accelerator story in a context of truly heterogeneous agents.
True heterogeneity occurs when agents are di⁄erent within the same group ￿
in the present framework we will deal with heterogeneity of ￿nancial conditions
across ￿rms ￿so that we cannot rely upon the representative agent device even
to describe the behaviour of a class of agents. True heterogeneity is obviously
appealing but has a major disadvantage: we need an aggregation procedure to
build the model from the bottom up. As it is well known from a large literature,
aggregation is not an innocuous task in economics.
In order to take heterogeneity seriously in macroeconomic modelling, one
should start with heterogeneous behavioural rules at the micro level and de-
termine the aggregate (macroeconomic) quantity ￿such as GDP ￿by adding
up the levels of a myriad of individual quantities. The increasing availability
of computational power has allowed the implementation of this bottom-up pro-
cedure in multi-agent models. Not surprisingly, in the last ten years or so, a
proliferation of agent-based models has paralleled the di⁄usion of research on
issues concerning heterogeneity2.
Multi-agent modelling is the most straightforward way of tackling the het-
erogeneity issue. In the profession at large, however, there is no agreement on
the opportunity of following this methodology. While some colleagues, mainly
in the unorthodox camp, eagerly embrace the new research strategy, some oth-
ers, mainly in the mainstream, are skeptical or even dismissal. There are at
least three reasons for this skepticism: (i) a basic distrust for the output of
computer simulations, which is generally very sensitive to the choice of initial
conditions and parameter values; (ii) a critique of adaptive micro-behavioural
rules which are often considered ad hoc; (iii) the di¢ culty and sometimes the
impossibility of thinking in macroeconomic terms, i.e. of using macro-variables
in the theoretical framework.
The ￿rst type of skepticism is rapidly fading away. After all, also Real Busi-
ness Cycle models are too complicated to be solved by pen and paper and must
be simulated. In order to do so RBC theorists have developed procedures to
calibrate their models which, with the passing of time and the spreading in the
profession, have become standard tools ￿we can even call them protocols ￿of
macroeconomic research.The same is true of agent-based models: Calibration
and validation is ranking high in the agenda of multi￿ agent models￿implemen-
tation.
1See Hartley (1997) for a detailed historical account of the development of the representa-
tive agent assumption and a thorough critique of its use and misuse.
2See Tesfatsion (2006) for a survey of agent based models.
2As to the behavioural rules at the micro-level, it is true that some of the most
enthusiastic believers in the heterogeneity mantra have seized the opportunity
of agent based modelling to implement complex adaptive systems. Multi-agent
models, in fact, allowe the comparison of the impact of di⁄erent behavioural
rules of thumb, which are often traced back to bounded rationality and adaptive
behaviour. There is no reason, however, to assume that this is the only way of
modelling individual choices. The multi-agent framework can also accomodate
models of optimizing behaviour of heterogeneous agents. The model presented
in this paper is a case in point as we will argue in a while.
Finally, the di¢ culty of thinking in macroeconomic terms can be circum-
vented by means of an appropriate aggregation procedure. In this paper we
adopt a stochastic aggregation procedure ￿labelled the Modi￿ed-Representative
Agent ￿which allows to resume macroeconomic thinking in a multi-agent frame-
work3.
The ambitious and apparently contradictory aim of the paper consists in
building a macrodynamic model starting from the assumption, well corroborated
by the existing evidence, that ￿rms di⁄er from one another according to their
￿nancial conditions. The diversity of ￿rms￿￿nancial conditions is the only type
of heterogeneity in the present framework. For the sake of analytical tractability,
we keep the degree of heterogeneity at the lowest possible level, i.e. only one
type of heterogeneity for only one class of agents. Therefore, we will stick
to the old-fashioned representative agent assumption as far as households are
concerned.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology. In
section 3 we describe the behaviour of ￿nancially constrained ￿rms. Section
4 analyzes the behaviour of households. In section 5 we describe and discuss
the macroeconomic equilibrium. In section 6 we discuss the macroeconomic
equilibrium under the assumption of zero growth. Finally in section 7 we derive
and discuss the dynamics generated by the model. Technical details are shown
in the appendix.
2 From micro to macro and return
We consider a closed economy populated by ￿rms, households, ￿nancial inter-
mediaries (banks) and the public sector (Government). Firms will be indexed
by i = 1;2;::;z with z ￿large￿ . Each ￿rm is characterized by a certain degree of
￿nancial robustness, captured by the equity ratio that is the ratio of the equity
base or net worth to the capital stock ait =
Ait
Kit
. Starting from the distribution
of the ￿rms￿equity ratio, we build a macrodynamic model in six steps.
Step 1. First of all we derive a behavioural rule at the microeconomic
level for investment activity in an optimizing framework (section 3). We adopt
3The procedure has already been used. See Agliari et al. (2000). It is thoroughly discussed
and compared with other aggregation procedures in Gallegati et al. (2006) where it is labelled
the Variant-Representative-Agent methodology, with a somewhat paradoxical touch.
3an optimizing perspective precisely to show that a multi-agent framework can
accomodate optimizing behavior. Following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) each
￿rm is assumed to maximize expected pro￿t less expected bankruptcy costs.
From the optimization we derive individual investment as a non-linear function
of the individual equity ratio given the level of some macroeconomic variables
￿i.e. variables which are uniform across agents ￿such as the real wage and the
real interest rate.
Step 2. Second, we apply the aggregation procedure mentioned above to
the individual investment functions. Due to the non-linearity of the individual
equations, we obtain average investment as a non-linear function of the moments
of the distribution of the equity ratio. For the sake of simplicity, we cut short
the procedure and consider only the ￿rst and second moments, that is the mean
and the variance of the equity ratio. The distribution of the equity ratio is
changing over time 4 and a⁄ects investment accordingly. In a sense, changes in
the distribution of the equity ratio, proxied by changes in the ￿rst and second
moments act as shocks of a distributive nature on investment.
Investment is a crucial part of any macroeconomic story. It is the most
volatile component of aggregate demand and an engine of aggregate supply inas-
much as it expands capacity. Therefore, the changing distribution of ￿nancial
conditions a⁄ects aggregate demand and supply through investment.
Step 3. The third step in developing the macroeconomic model consists
in framing investment in a general equilibrium context. In order to do so, we
have to analyze households￿behaviour (section 4). We keep things as simple
and as close to the mainstream conceptual framework as possible. The repre-
sentative household chooses the optimal consumption plan and desired money
balances maximizing utility over an in￿nite horizon subject to a sequence of
budget constraints which incorporate money and bonds.
In equilibrium on the goods market, the consumption of the representative
agent, together with investment and Government expenditure, yields a relation-
ship between the interest rate and the output gap reminiscent of a IS curve.
The moments of the distribution of the equity ratio are shift parameters of the
IS curve.
In equilibrium on the money market, the demand for money of the represen-
tative agent, together with the (exogenous) money supply yields a relationship
between the interest rate, the output gap and real money balances reminiscent
of a LM curve.
Finally, imposing a zero-growth condition in order to focus on business ￿ uc-
tuations, we obtain a relationship between the interest rate and the moments
of the distribution of the equity ratio. In the end we obtain a simple macroeco-
nomic model, which can be solved for the equilibrium values of the interest rate,
the output gap and the price level (section 5). All of the endogenous variables
in equilibrium turn out to be functions of the moments of the distribution of
the equity ratio.
4Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) do consider the variance of agents￿ net worth as an important
factor in the reaction of the macroeconomy to a shock but do not take up this issue in a
dynamical context.
4Steps one, two and three are the milestones of a route from the micro to the
macro level. In a sense they provide the microfoundations of a macroeconomic
model with heterogeneous agents. The di⁄erence between the traditional micro-
foundations based on the representative agent and the new ones is the explicit
consideration in the latter of the moments of the distribution of the equity ra-
tio5. Since moments are a concise measure of the shape of the distribution, by
focusing on moments we resume macroeconomic thinking in its purest form, i.e.
at a general, non microeconomic, level.
So far, we have treated the moments of the distribution as pre-determined
variables. In order to endogenize the dynamics of the moments, we have to go
back to the micro level and focus on the law of motion of the individual equity
ratio which is a function, among other things, of the interest rate (section 7).
Step 4. The fourth step consists in plugging the equilibrium value of the
interest rate ￿which is a function of the moments of the distribution ￿into the
individual law of motion. As a consequence, the current equity ratio turns out
to be a function not only of the individual lagged equity ratio but also of the
lagged average equity ratio and variance. A mean ￿eld e⁄ect is at work: the
average or macro state variable, in fact, a⁄ects the micro state variable. In a
sense we incorporate a macrofoundation of the micro-dynamics.
Step 5. The ￿fth step consists in describing the dynamics of the moments.
Two paths can be followed. The individual law of motion can be simulated
in a multi-agent setting and macroeconomic aggregates can be determined by
adding up individual quantities. The moments are computed directly from the
empirical distribution obtained from simulated data. As an alternative, one can
apply an aggregation procedure to the individual law of motion and determine
a two dimensional non-linear dynamic system in discrete time which describes
the evolution over time of the mean and the variance of the distribution itself.
Step 6. The sixth and ￿nal step consists in exploring the feedback from
the dynamics of the moments to the aggregate variables. Both the steady state
solution and transitional dynamics are interesting determinants of the aggregate.
3 Firms
Firms will be indexed by i = 1;2;::;z with z ￿large￿ . They produce a homoge-
neous good by means of capital and labor and invest in order to expand capacity.
The assumption of a large number of ￿rms which produce an undi⁄erentiated
good implies that the market structure is competitive, i.e. ￿rms are price takers.
Financial conditions. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their ￿nancial
robustness captured by the equity ratio ait. In other words, the equity ratio
of the i-th ￿rm at time t ait is a random variable with support (0;1), whose
5In our simple case, since we cut short the aggregation procedure and consider only the
￿rst and second moments, the only di⁄erence between old and new microfoundations is the
variance of the distribution. In fact the ￿rst moment, i.e. the mean of the equity ratio, would
be present also in the traditional microfoundations. The equity ratio of the representative
agent coincides with the mean of the distribution of the equity ratio when the variance is
zero.
5distribution is characterized by expected value E (ait) = at and variance E(ait￿
at)2 = Vt. The expected value is the equity ratio of the average agent (average
equity ratio for short). The variance measures the dispersion of the actual equity
ratios around the average. The representative agent is a particular case of this
framework: it coincides with the average agent when the variance is zero. In
other words the representative agent is the zero-variance average agent.
Firms cannot raise external ￿nance on the equity market (due to equity
rationing: Myers and Majluf, 1984; Greenwald et al., 1984) so that they have
to rely on bank loans to ￿nance investment. Therefore, they run the risk of
bankruptcy. Banks extend credit to ￿rms at an interest rate r which is uniform
across ￿rms and equal to the interest rate on bonds.
Technology and market structure. Each ￿rm carries on production by means
of a constant returns to scale technology that uses labor and capital as in-
puts. For simplicity we assume that technology is of the Leontief type and
uniform across ￿rms.The production function of the i-th ￿rm therefore is Yi =
min(￿Ni;￿Ki) where Yi;Ni and Ki represent output, employment and capital
(in the current period, i.e. at time t), ￿ and ￿ are positive parameters which
measure the productivity of capital and labour respectively.










of the capital/labour ratio. Since these parameters are constant, by assumption
output, capital and employment grow at the same rate. We will determine
the rate of capital accumulation endogenously (see below) and will assume that
output and employment grow at the same rate of the capital stock.
Pro￿t. Pro￿t of the i-th ￿rm in real terms in the current period (￿i) is the
di⁄erence between revenues (uiYi) and total costs, which consist of production
















ui is the average revenue of the ￿rm. For the sake of simplicity we assume
that it is a random variable uniformly distributed over the interval (0;2) with
E(ui) = 1 where E(ui) is the expected value of the ￿rms￿average revenues,
i.e. the expected average revenue; w is the real wage rate, r is the real interest
rate, Ii = Ki ￿ Kit￿1 is investment6 and ￿ K =
K
z




Ki being the aggregate capital stock. For the moment we assume that
the real wage is given and constant.
The pro￿t function is characterized by an idiosyncratic shock to revenues
due, for instance, to a sudden change in preferences. Adjustment costs are
quadratic in investment (as usual in investment theory) and decreasing in the
average capital stock, i.e. we assume a positive externality in the accumulation
6For the sake of simplicity we assume that there is no depreciation.
6of capital: the higher the economywide capital stock, the lower adjustment costs
for the single ￿rm. This is essentially a technical assumption, which allows to
determine a relatively simple interior solution to the ￿rm￿ s optimization problem
(see below).
Bankruptcy. The probability of bankruptcy for the i-th ￿rm depends, among
other things, on the equity ratio (see the appendix for a discussion). For the
sake of analytical tractability we assume that ￿rms adopt the following proxy





where 0 < ￿ < 1. From (2) follows that the ￿rm goes bankrupt with probability
one if the equity ratio falls to ￿. Therefore the minimum of the equity ratio, i.e.
the threshold the ￿rm should not pass otherwise it goes bankrupt is ￿. On the
other hand, since the maximum equity ratio is one, the minimum probability
of bankruptcy is ￿. Hence both ait￿1 and ￿i are de￿ned on the interval (￿;1).
Also the de￿nition (2) is essentially a technical assumption. More complicated
formulations of the probability of bankruptcy would have made the model very
di¢ cult to manage without adding much to the results.
Bankruptcy is costly and the cost of bankruptcy is an increasing linear func-
tion of the capital that the ￿rm owns, i.e. CBi = ￿Ki where ￿ is a positive
parameter.
The objective function of the ￿rm Vi is the di⁄erence between expected
pro￿t E (￿i) and bankruptcy (or borrower￿ s) risk, i.e. bankruptcy cost in case
bankruptcy occurs CBi￿i:










In case there were no bankruptcy, i.e. ￿ = 0, (3) would boil down to:







i.e to expected pro￿t. Comparing the objective functions (3) and (4) we see
that (3) is smaller than (4) i.e. to expected pro￿t.
Recall now that Yi = ￿Ki and Ni =
￿
￿
Ki. As a consequence, the problem






















where the control variable is the individual capital stock7. Notice that, due
to the Leontief technology, once the stock of capital has been optimally deter-



















7mined solving the problem above, both output and employment follow being
proportional to capital.
From the FOC we obtain:














In principle ￿i can be negative. ￿i < 0 if the capital stock is shrinking, i.e.
Ii = Ki￿Kit￿1 < 0, a situation which we could not rule out ￿due for instance to
a process of ￿creative distruction￿which requires stripping obsolete machinery
￿but which should be relatively rare. The most common scenario in which




According to (5), ignoring technological parameters, the individual invest-
ment ratio depends on two variables which are uniform across ￿rms (the costs
of primary inputs w;r) and on one individual variable, namely the degree of
￿nancial robustness ait￿1. In particular, as one could expect, the investment












In the absence of bankruptcy costs (￿ = 0) we obtain the ￿rst best:
^ ￿ = ￿ ￿ r (6)
According to (6), in the ￿rst best the investment ratio depends only on the
costs of primary inputs w, r. Of course, ￿nancial robustness ait￿1 has no role to
play. Notice that, according to intuition, in the ￿rst best the investment ratio























Hence, it depends on the costs of primary inputs w and r, which are uniform
across ￿rms and on the distribution of the ￿rms￿ degree of ￿nancial robustness
(a1t￿1;a2t￿1;::;azt￿1).
In the following we will ￿summarize￿the distribution with its ￿rst and second
moments. In order to do so we approximate the individual investment ratio in
the neighborhood of average ￿nancial robustness (E (ait￿1) = at￿1) as follows:
￿i ￿ ￿R +
@￿i
@ait￿1






jat￿1 (ait￿1 ￿ at￿1)
2
8where:


















￿R is the investment ratio of the Representative Agent8.
We can compute the average investment ratio taking the expected value of
the expression above:








E (ait￿1 ￿ at￿1)
2 (7)
Notice that by de￿nition of expected value E (ait￿1 ￿ at￿1) = 0. Moreover
E (ait￿1 ￿ at￿1)
2 = Vt￿1 is the variance of the distribution of equity ratios.























Ignoring technological coe¢ cients, in the following we will refer to the aver-
age investment ratio with the expression:












is a function of the relevant moments of the distributions of the ￿rms according
to ￿nancial robustness. In the following, we will de￿ne a positive distributive
shock as a change in one or more of the basic features of the distributions which
boosts the average investment ratio. Therefore a positive distributive shock
could be an increase of at￿1 or a decrease of Vt￿1.
Notice that the average investment ratio in the presence of heterogeneity ￿ is
smaller than the investment ratio of the representative agent ￿R which in turn
is smaller than the investment ratio in the ￿rst best ^ ￿.
4 Households
As to households, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that they are homoge-
neous in every respect so that we can adopt the representative agent hypothesis.




9Households demand consumption goods, ￿nancial assets (bonds) and money bal-
ances (deposits). Money balances are desirable because they provide "liquidity
services" which are necessary if transactions require a means of payment, as we
will assume. Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that there is no currency, base
money coincides with banks￿reserves at the central bank and money coincides
with deposits. We assume that deposits are not remunerated. The interest rate
on bonds is the opportunity cost of holding money.
The representative household supplies inelastically one unit of labour. Since
by assumption all the pro￿ts are retained within the ￿rm, the only source of
income for the representative agent is the wage rate if employed, the unemploy-
ment subsidy if unemployed. In symbols, income is wk with k = u;e where e
stands for employed and u for unemployed: we = w (i.e. the real wage rate),
wu = ￿ (i.e. the unemployment subsidy).















where ct is consumption, mt are (per capita) money balances, ￿ is the rate of
time preference, 0 < ￿ < 1.















is the real gross rate of return on money holdings. By de￿nition,
1
￿t￿1
￿ 1 is the in￿ ation rate. The expression (1 + i)￿t￿1 = 1 + rt is the real
gross interest rate.
According to the budget constraint, the sum of consumption and the de-
mand for money and bonds should be equal to income plus interest payments
(1 + i)bt￿1 and money balances mt￿1 (carried over from the previous period).
The problem of the representative household, therefore, consists in maximiz-
















s:t: ct = wk +
mt￿1
Pt￿1














































































￿t+1 (1 + i)￿t = 0 (15)
Solving (13) (14) (15) for ct;mt=Pt we obtain the following relation between


























Substituting (16) and (17) into (11) we obtain the optimal consumption function











Total consumption is the sum of consumption of the employed and con-
sumption of the unemployed people. Each type of consumption, in turn, is the
product of per-capita consumption times the number of agents in each group
(employed and unemployed people respectively). Therefore:
Ct = wNt + ￿(L ￿ Nt) (18)
where L is total labour force.
Total demand for money is the sum of the demand for money of the employed
and of the unemployed people. Each type of demand for money, in turn, is
11the product of per-capita demand times the number of agents in each group









[wNt + ￿(L ￿ Nt)] (19)
5 The macroeconomic equilibrium
In this economy there will be markets for labor, goods and ￿nancial assets. We
will not impose an equilibrium condition on the labor market. In other words
the labor market can be characterized by underemployment associated with
equilibrium on the money and goods markets. Thanks to Walras￿law, there
will be also equilibrium on the market for ￿nancial assets.
The goods market is in equilibrium (planned expenditure is equal to actual
expenditure) if Ct + It + Gt = Yt where Ct is aggregate consumption, It is
aggregate investment, Gt is government expenditure. Ct is de￿ned as in (18).
Investment is It = ￿Kt where ￿ = ￿ ￿r￿f and f = f (at￿1;Vt￿1)(see equation
(9)).
The Government carries on public expenditure, which can be thought of as
investment (for instance in infrastructures). For the sake of simplicity, it does
not raise taxes9. We assume that Government expenditure is proportional to
the investment gap, i.e. the di⁄erence between the ￿rst best investment ratio
and the current average investment ratio:
Gt = "(^ ￿ ￿ ￿)Kt = "fKt (20)
with 0 < " < 1. Therefore, in equilibrium the following must hold true:
wNt + ￿(L ￿ Nt) + (￿ ￿ r ￿ f)Kt + "fKt = Yt (21)



























is the ratio of employment to population. 10Notice that, thanks
to the linearity of technology, xt can be thought of also as the output gap11.









￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ")f (23)
This relation between r and x represents the IS curve of our model.
9Therefore the budget de￿cit coincides with the sum of Government expenditure and un-
employment subsidies.
10As a consequence, the unemployment rate is ut = 1 ￿ xt
11In fact, Yi = ￿Ki = ￿Ni. Hence Nt = Yi=￿ and L = ^ Y =￿ where ^ Y is potential output.
12We now turn to the money market. Total demand for money is represented
by equation (19). In order to simplify the analysis we can assume that ￿t = 1
(i.e. the price level is not growing over time) so that the nominal and real






t is money supply and normalizing by L the equilibrium




























is per-capita money supply. This relation
between r and x represents the LM curve of our model.
Figure 1: Macroeconomic Equilibrium
In ￿gure 1 we represent the macroeconomic equilibrium. The moments of
the distribution of the equity ratio are shift parameters of the IS curve. For each
level of the real interest rate, the higher the mean and the lower the variance
of the equity ratio, the higher will be employment and output. If for example
we consider a certain value of the mean (a0) and of the variance (V0) of the
13distribution, given the LM curve, the economy converge to the equilibrium E.
At this point we consider the case in which the mean of the distribution increases
while the variance decreases, the IS curve shifts up and the new macroeconomic
equilibrium is represented by the point E0 with an higher level of both the
outgap and the real interest rate. We are able to infer that changes in the
moments of the distributions of the equity ratio have aggregate e⁄ects.
6 A convenient special case
Let￿ s now turn to the supply side of the model. Due to linearity of the tech-
nology, aggregate output and employment grow at the same rate as the capital
stock. The rate of growth of the capital stock ￿say g ￿in turn is an increas-
ing non linear function of the investment ratio. It is easy to see, in fact, that
1 + g =
1
1 ￿ ￿
. In order to focus on business ￿ uctuations, we impose a zero-
growth condition g = 0 which implies ￿ = 0. Imposing this condition into (9)
we get:
r = ￿ ￿ f (25)
In this special case, in fact aggregate investments are equal to zero by def-
inition and Government expenditure becomes Gt = "^ ￿Kt, i.e. it depends only
on the ￿rst best investment ratio. Therefore, imposing the market clearing






















Notice that under the zero growth condition the IS curve does not depend on
the function f, whose arguments are the moments of the distribution of the
equity ratio.
The macroeconomic model in structural form with zero growth, therefore
consists of equations (26) (??) and (25). From the third equation we obtain the







￿ f = r￿(at￿1;Vt￿1) (27)






. Substituting (27) into the (26) we are able



























14Figure 2: E⁄ects of a change in the moments of the distribution of the equity
ratio under zero growth assumption
Since the nominal money supply is exogenous, equation (29) implicitly de-
termines the price level in equilibrium.
In ￿gure 2 we represent the macroeconomic equilibrium under the assump-
tion of zero growth. The equilibrium real interest rate r￿(at￿1;Vt￿1), as de￿ned
in equation (27) depends on the mean and the variance of the distribution. In
particular the higher the mean and the lower the variance of the equity ratio,
the higher will be the real interest rate. Given r￿(at￿1;Vt￿1) the LM curve
crosses the IS curve in point E￿ that represents the equilibrium of our economy.
Consider know the case in which the mean of the distribution increases while the
variance decreases, the real interest rate will increase (r￿(at;Vt)). Di⁄erently
from the previous section, in this case the IS curve will not shift. Given the
value of the real interest rate r￿(at;Vt), the prices adjust so that the LM curve
will move up and will intersect the IS curve in the new equilibrium point E0,
that is characterized by a lower output gap. Even if the IS curve is independent
from the moments of the distribution of the equity ratio, changes in the mean
and the variance of the distribution have aggregate e⁄ects.
157 Dynamics
In this section we explore the dynamics stemming from the macroeconomic
model presented in the previous section. First of all we have to establish the
law of motion of the individual net worth. Assuming that there are no dividends,
the level of net worth in real terms for the i-th ￿rm in t is Ait = Ait￿1 + ￿i.
Recalling (1) we get:






















































































Substituting (32) into (31) and assuming that ki ’ 1 ￿i.e. assuming that the
￿rms di⁄er in terms of ￿nancial conditions but have approximately the same
size ￿after rearranging and simplifying we get:









where ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ui)￿. The expression above represents the individual law
of motion of the equity ratio.It is a non linear ￿rst order di⁄erence equation in
the state variable ait.
Equation (33) can be simulated. For instance, in ￿gure 3 we have reported
the ￿rst and second moment of the distribution of the equity ratio generated by
(33). The two moments seem to be positively correlated. When on average the
￿nancial conditions of ￿rms improve, also the dispersion of individual ￿nancial
conditions around mean increases. In principle, the e⁄ects of a simultaneous
increase of the mean and the variance on the aggregate macroeconomic perfor-
mance are uncertain. In fact the model predicts that aggregate output goes up
if either the mean increases or the variance decreases.
16Figure 3: Mean and variance of the distribution
It is worth noting that re￿ning the aggregation procedure described in section
3 and applied to the investment ratio, we could take into account also the impact
of the evolution of higher moments ￿such as skewness ￿on aggregate variables.
For the moment we stick to the simplest case.
In ￿gure 4 we plot the real interest rate and the output gap. The two
variables are clearly negatively correlated. This is due to the simplifying but
restrictive zero growth assumption, which forces the economy to move along an
IS curve that is independent from the moments of the distribution.
























































































Figure 4: Real interest rate and output gap
A The probability of bankruptcy
The true probability of bankruptcy can be determined as follows.
Assuming that there are no dividends, the level of net worth in real terms













Hence Ait = Ait￿1 + uiYi ￿ TCi.
A ￿rm goes bankrupt if Ait < 0, i.e. if:




where ACi = TCi=Yi is average cost. In words: the ￿rm goes bankrupt if the
realization of the random shock is smaller than a threshold ￿ ui which in turn
depends on equity, output, and the average cost. By assumption, the shock
is a uniformly distributed random variable ui with support (0;2), so that the
probability of bankruptcy is:












Let￿ s assume, as in the text of the paper, that the cost of bankruptcy is CBi =
18￿Ki. The objective function of the ￿rm Vi is the di⁄erence between expected
pro￿t E (￿i) and bankruptcy cost in case bankruptcy occurs CBi Pr(ui < ￿ ui):








0 = ￿=2￿. Rearranging one gets:






The present formalization of the probability of bankruptcy makes clear that
taking into account the expected bankruptcy cost in the objective function is
tantamount to incurring an extra cost equal to ￿
0TCi and gaining an extrarev-
enue equal to ￿
0Ait￿1.
The formalization, however, has a clear disadvantage in terms of tractability.
In fact, plugging Yi = ￿Ki and Ni =
￿
￿
Ki into (34) and rearranging, the
probability of bankruptcy turns out to be:























The probability of bankruptcy is decreasing with the equity ratio but it depends
on a large number of parameters and endogenous variables.








The interior solution to the maximization of Vi therefore is smaller than the
￿rst best ^ ￿ = ￿ ￿ w
￿
￿
￿ r but is uniform across ￿rms and independent of net
worth. Therefore we would miss an important part of the ￿nancial fragility
strory we want to tell. In order to keep net worth into the interior solution we
can experiment with di⁄erent bankruptcy cost functions, such as CBi = ￿K2
i .
In this case however, the interior solution becomes rapidly very messy. With an
acceptable loss of generality we adopt the approximation of the text.
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